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In most rms, managers periodically assess workers' performance. Evidence sug-
gests that managers withhold information during these reviews, and some observers
argue that this necessarily reduces surplus. This paper assesses the validity of this
argument when workers have career concerns. Disclosure has two eects: it exposes
the worker to uncertainty about future eort levels, but allows him to use current ef-
fort to inuence his employer's beliefs about future eort. The surplus-maximizing
disclosure policy reveals output realizations in the center of the distribution, but
not in the tails. Thus, it is ecient for rms to reveal some but not all performance
information.
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Performance appraisal systems within organizations are an ancient and common insti-
tution.1 They also consume many rm resources through the demands they place on
human-resource oces and managerial time.2
At the same time, performance appraisals are often not fully informative. A typical
rm conducts periodic reviews in which supervisors give numerical ratings to the workers
they oversee. Figure 1 displays a rating distribution from a medium-sized service rm in
the United States, where 1 is associated with highest performance, and 5 the worst.3
Figure 1: Rating Distribution Example
At the very least, one can conclude that managers in this rm do not dierentiate
among performance levels as much as the rating scale allows: 4 and 5 make up just one
percent of the sample, and fty percent of workers receive the rating 2. While one might
argue that this distribution reects true performance, there is suggestive evidence that it
reects information hiding. Several studies have shown that the ratings that supervisors
report to workers are signicantly higher and more skewed than the ratings they report to
independent researchers (see Murphy and Cleveland 1991, p.79, and references therein).
Also, the same patterns emerge when rating categories have labels such as \average" and
\below average" (Gibbs 1991).4 Finally, workers and managers themselves report that
1Performance appraisal systems were in place by 300 AD in the Chinese state bureaucracy. As of the
early 1980's, between seventy four and eighty nine per cent of American businesses used them (Murphy
and Cleveland 1991).
2The Chief Human Resource Counsel for International Paper recently noted that \...few tasks occupy
as much time by human resource professionals as designing, implementing, monitoring, and defending
performance appraisal systems" (Murphy and Margulies 2004).
3This gure is taken from Lazear and Gibbs (2008). The larger dataset on which it is based was
analyzed in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstr om (1994a) and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstr om (1994b). Although
this is evidence from one rm, other rms' rating distributions exhibit similar patterns (Medo and
Abraham 1980, Murphy 1992).
4In one particularly stark example, Milkovich, Newman, and Milkovich (2007) report a ten-year study
of a thousand-member social service department in which only three of the possible ten thousand ratings
were \below average".
1managers do not distinguish among workers.5
For the most part, researchers have attributed limited feedback to organizational dys-
function in one way or another, implicitly assuming that a departure from full information
disclosure is a pathology to be explained.6 However, economic analysis of performance
appraisal systems is very limited, and without rst understanding the precise eects of
feedback, it is impossible to comment on what is the surplus maximizing amount of in-
formation provision. The aim of this paper is to partially ll this gap in understanding.
Its central nding is that there are reasonable circumstances under which rms would
like to commit to disclosing some, but not full, information about performance. This
has two important implications: (1) the fact that rms invest in performance appraisal
systems that they then use to provide limited feedback is compatible with eciency and
(2) the welfare loss from distortions in feedback (of which there are surely many) should
not necessarily be computed from a full-disclosure benchmark.
The argument is the following. In period 0, ex ante symmetric rms compete for a
worker (he) who must be retained in periods 1 and 2, after which rms again compete
to hire the worker for period 3. The rst and second period employer privately observes
the worker's performance, which it cannot credibly disclose to the outside labor market.
After period 2, the employer retains the worker if and only if his expected ability crosses a
threshold. More importantly, due to the informational asymmetry between his employer
and outside rms, the worker earns a constant wage if retained and a constant, lower, wage
if released, meaning that he earns a xed reputational reward for meeting the employer's
(endogenous) retention standard.7 The worker's rst and second period work incentives
come solely through career concerns, and he exerts eort to signal an ability level that
surpasses the retention standard.
While the initial employer cannot commit to disclosing the worker's performance to
the outside labor market, it can commit to a disclosure policy that gives the worker
information about his rst period performance before he chooses second period eort.
In particular, a disclosure policy partitions the rst period output space and reports to
the worker into which element of the partition his output lies.8 Unlike in the standard
5In a case study of Merck, Murphy (1992) reports such sentiments as \Tell me this, how in the world
can 83 per cent of the people be exceeding job expectations while the company, as a whole, is doing just
average?" and \How can I rate my people objectively when the other directors are giving all their people
4s? A 3 isn't acceptable. I wouldn't mind if everyone played by the same rules, but they don't."
6For example, Baron and Kreps (1999) argue that managers are not rewarded for providing accurate
appraisals so do not exert the required eort to obtain performance information; Longenecker, Sims,
and Gioia (1987) emphasize managers' consideration of organizational politics when providing feedback;
Jackman and Strober (2003) suggest that worker's psychological reactions to feedback may inhibit man-
agerial truth telling; and Prendergast and Topel (1996) show that managers bias feedback as a result of
favoritism for their workers.
7The reason for wage pooling is similar to that in Waldman (1984).
8The paper assumes that the set of possible feedback messages is rich enough to describe all per-
2career concerns model (Holmstr om 1999), second period eort is history dependent since
information about rst period performance allows the worker to update his belief on
how close his ability is to the retention threshold. More specically, second period eort
is highest when expected ability lies on the retention threshold and is monotonically
decreasing as it moves away from it. In this setup, information disclosure has two primary
eects:
1. Eort risk. Whenever two feedback messages induce two dierent eort levels,
expected second period eort costs increase compared to a disclosure policy that
combines them. More information increases the variance of second period eort,
which the worker dislikes since his preferences are given by his convex cost of eort
function.
2. Coasting incentive. When the worker nds out the exact value of his rst period
output, he can use rst period eort to reduce the amount of eort his employer
expects him to exert in the second (i.e. convince the employer he will coast) because
the employer uses rst period output to form its beliefs on second period eort.
Whenever the disclosed output realization leads to an updated belief about expected
ability that lies above (below) the retention threshold, exerting higher (lower) eort
in the rst period decreases the employer's belief on second period eort by moving
its belief on expected ability further away from the threshold. 9
The surplus maximizing disclosure policy (oered by rms to the worker in period
0) must balance these two eects. Assuming that signal jamming incentives alone are
insucient to support rst-best rst period eort, there is scope for increasing surplus
by disclosing output realizations that lead to expected ability beliefs above the retention
threshold. However, disclosing output realizations that lead to expected ability beliefs
both near the retention threshold and that are very high expose the worker to the most
risk: in these cases, actual second period eort diers substantially from its expected
value. The ecient disclosure policy therefore discloses a convex, bounded set of out-
put realizations all of which lead to inferred ability above the retention threshold, and
combines all other output realizations in a single message.
The basic setup holds xed one information asymmetry (that between the employer
and outside rms) and endogenizes another (that between the employer and the worker)
formance levels, but that the principal endogenously opts to coarsen feedback. In the real world, it is
unclear whether rms' giving mangers a nite set of messages to deliver to workers reects a discrete
number of distinguishable performance levels or an exogenous source of coarsening.
9The important incentive eect in the model comes from the anticipation of feedback, not the reaction
to it. In fact, with quadratic eort costs, expected second period eort is independent of the disclosure
policy. Two recent empirical papers, Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2009) and Azmat and Iriberri (2010)
have found an anticipatory eect on eort of feedback, although in environments without career concerns.
3in order to keep the focus squarely on feedback within organizations. Before concluding,
the paper examines an alternative informational environment: one in which outside rms
perfectly observe the worker's performance prior to the third period. As long as there is
some xed payo component to remaining in the industry, second period eort remains
single peaked in expected ability, and the qualitative features of the ecient disclosure
policy remain unchanged if the prior belief on worker talent is high enough. Thus the
basic message of the paper is not necessarily tied to a particular assumption on what
outside rms can observe about worker performance.
Related Literature There is a small but growing literature that analyzes feedback
in organizations within a variety of contracting frameworks. Several recent papers solve
for the eort maximizing disclosure policy in tournaments with an exogenous prize. Aoy-
agi (2007) nds that information disclosure increases expected eort in the presence of
concave marginal costs and reduces expected eort in the presence of convex marginal
costs. This paper assumes linear marginal costs, so these eects are not present. Closer
in spirit is Ederer (2008), who introduces complementarity between ability and eort
into the production function so that workers' eort depends on their beliefs about ability.
He also nds that interim feedback gives rise to rst period eort incentives, since each
worker wants to signal a high ability to his opponent to discourage him from exerting
eort in the second period. However, in this paper, the worker is not competing with
someone else, but seeking to push the employer's belief about his ability above an ab-
solute standard. Feedback generates incentives because the worker wants to manipulate
the belief of his employer to make achieving the standard easier.10
Lizzeri, Meyer, and Persico (2002) study optimal disclosure in a two period moral
hazard problem with explicit contracting. Information disclosure increases expected sec-
ond period eort costs in all cases due to eort risk, and increases rst period eort
whenever wages are non-linear in output.11 If the worker's wage schedule is xed, there
are circumstances under which full disclosure increases surplus relative to no disclosure,
but no analysis is made of partial disclosure.
MacLeod (2003) analyzes how to sustain eort in a principal-agent model in which the
principal privately observes the agent's subjective output. The optimal contract pays the
10Goltsman and Mukherjee (2008) also derive the optimality of partial feedback in a tournament
framework due to the following tension: on the one hand, the designer wants to maintain competition in
the second stage of the tournament by not informing workers when their rst period outputs dier; on
the other, workers would like to exert eort in the rst period to avoid ending up in competitive second
stage.
11The rst period incentive eects arise because of the dierence in the marginal product of second
period eort. Although ability is in the production function, it is a xed productivity parameter that
the agent cannot inuence through eort exertion.
4agent a constant wage for all output realizations except the one most informative about
low eort, following which the principal \burns" money, reducing the agent's surplus.12
He interprets feedback as synonymous with wage payments, so that the rating distribution
is coarser than the output distribution. By contrast, in this paper, feedback messages
are not connected to wage payments; indeed, the worker's third period wage schedule is
independent of the disclosure policy. Instead, feedback changes the worker's belief about
where along the wage schedule his expected ability lies, and complements the underlying
signal jamming incentives.
This paper relates to several papers in the career concerns literature initiated by
Holmstr om (1999). Kovrijnykh (2007) and Martinez (2009) point out that, in the presence
of history dependence, the worker's current eort aects the market's belief about his
future eort, which is the basis for this paper's coasting incentive. However, neither
paper explores the relationship between information disclosure and the risk-incentive
trade-o this paper identies.13 Koch and Peyrache (2010) and Mukherjee (2008) both
examine the eect of information release to the labor market in the presence of worker
career concerns. The former examines a situation in which the market can back out
worker ability from wage payments. The optimal contract does not fully reveal ability to
the outside market because doing so weakens the worker's reputational incentives. In the
latter, a commitment by the employer to full information disclosure to the outside market
eliminates adverse selection and increases the up-front surplus it can extract from the
worker, as long as it can insure him with a long-term wage contract. This paper instead
takes as given the amount of information the outside market receives about performance,
and considers the eect of information disclosure just to the worker. It also rules out
incentive pay by assuming output is purely subjective.
Finally, two recent paper examine other environments in which the principal has pri-
vate information on workers' abilities and can provide feedback. Ray (2007) considers a
situation in which a principal privately observes an agent's ability prior to their commenc-
ing a project together. A trade-o arises between disclosing information to induce the
worker to tailor eort to ability and withholding it to retain him. In some cases, revealing
performance information on the tails of the ability distribution and withholding it in the
middle is optimal. Crutzen, Swank, and Visser (2010) model communication between the
principal and two agents as a cheap talk game and show that some information can be
transmitted in equilibrium, although less than the ecient amount. Neither paper is a
12Fuchs (2007) extends this model to multiple periods and nds that the optimal contract pays a
constant wage unless the principal observes the lowest output realization for all periods.
13Kovrijnykh (2007) asks a dierent question about information release: at what point in time do all
actors in the model want to become aware of worker performance? He shows that by delaying the release
of information, overexertion in early periods can be mitigated.
5career-concerns model as such since the prinicpal already knows ability; in particular they
do not shed light on the relationship between signal jamming and information disclosure.
The organization is as follows. The next section lays out the model; the third derives
the equilibrium of period three labor market competition; the fourth discusses the eects
of feedback; and the fth derives the equilibrium disclosure policy. The sixth section
examines the situation where market rms observe worker performance, and the seventh
section concludes. The appendix contains all proofs.
2 Model
There are four time periods t = 0;1;2;3. In period 0 three identical rms indexed by i
compete to hire a single risk-neutral worker (he) for periods 1 and 2 by simultaneously
oering employment contracts whose components are dened below. Once a rm hires
the worker, they are matched for two periods. The rm that hires the worker is the
employer E while the other two rms in the market are M1 and M2.
In periods 1 and 2, the worker produces yt =  + at + "t in whichever rm he joins,
where  is talent, at is eort, and "t  N (0;2
") is an output shock. Neither the worker nor






where  > 0. The cost to the worker of exerting eort is g(at) = C
2a2
t, and he has an
outside option of 0.
After period 2 rms again compete for the worker, and he has the opportunity to move
to another rm. First the employer makes the worker a wage oer in wE
3 2 W E
3 = R+.
Both market rms observe wE
3 and then simultaneously make wage oers wm
3 2 W m
3 =
R+ for m = 1;2. If the worker remains with the employer in period 3, his output is
yE
3 =  +  + "3 where "3  N (0;2
") is an output shock and  > 0 reects rm specic
human capital accumulation. If the worker instead moves to another rm his output is
yM
3 =  + "3.14 The role of  is discussed in the following section.
If the worker receives no positive wage oer, he leaves the market. Otherwise, he
moves to the rm that oers him the highest wage. If the employer matches the highest
wage oered by the market rms, the worker remains with the employer. If M1 and
M2 jointly oer the highest wage, he joins each with probability 0.5. Thus the worker's
third period wage is w3 = maxf0;wE
3 ;w1
3;w2
3g. Finally, if any rm makes a positive wage
oer, it incurs an arbitrarily small cost , which could for example be the legal costs from
drafting a wage contract. These assumptions together imply that third period prot for
14The fact that third period output does not depend on eort is without loss of generality as the
worker will exert zero eort in the last period since career concerns cease to exist.
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The paper makes the standard informational assumption that the worker privately
observes his eort. However, the paper also makes the non-standard assumption that the
employer privately observes his output. This creates two distinct potential informational
asymmetries: one between the employer and market rms and one between the employer
and the worker. Since the focus of the paper is feedback within organizations, it will
take as exogenous the informational asymmetry between the employer and market and
assume that outside rms do not observe any direct signal of the worker's output. This
assumption also rules out contracting on output since output is necessarily unveriable.
As a result, in period 0 rm i can only oer the worker a xed compensation wi
0 equal
to the present discounted value of wages in periods 1 and 2, and eort incentives arise in
periods 1 and 2 solely to increase expected third period wages.
In period 0 rms can also commit to revealing information to the worker between
periods 1 and 2 through choosing a disclosure policy P i.15 Thus a contract is the pair
(wi
0;P i). A disclosure policy is a partition P of the rst period output space Y1 = R with
the interpretation that the worker learns that y1 2 P(y1), the element of the partition
into which his rst period output falls. One important subset of these elements is the set
of disclosed output realizations Y D
1 (P) = fy1 j P(y1) = y1 g. To avoid measure-theoretic
technicalities, the paper puts some additional structure on disclosure policies.
Assumption 1 Y D
1 is either empty or is a union of positive measure intervals. Moreover,
whenever Y D
1 6= R, every non-singleton element of a disclosure policy is a union of positive
measure intervals.
15Disclosing information to the worker after period 2 is payo irrelevant to all actors in the model.
7While this denition is compatible with full disclosure (P(y1) = y1 for all y1) and no
disclosure (P(y1) = Y1 for all y1), it can also accommodate many intermediate case
(reveal whether output is above or below a certain threshold, disclose output over some
interval and hide all other realizations, etc.). The no disclosure policy is used in the
statement of some results, so the paper will denote it by P N.
There are two important implicit assumptions that are important to clarify. The rst
is that, while it can obscure information, rms cannot lie to the worker about his rst
period performance. Indeed, the solution to the model will show that the employer has
an incentive to lie to the worker if given the opportunity to do so. Why then assume
commitment? First, it sets the benchmark for what the employer's preferred disclosure
policy would be in the absence of communication (or other) frictions. One can then use
this benchmark to compute the welfare loss of deviations from the optimal policy that
may arise for whatever reason. Second, in a more complex model in which the employer
and worker interact for multiple periods or in which there are multiple workers hired by
the employer that can compare the information they receive, the employer may not have
an incentive to lie.
The second important assumption is that the information that workers receive about
their performance is not veriable. Otherwise, there would be an indirect channel through
which outside rms could discover worker performance: through asking workers them-
selves. The paper maintains this assumption primarily to isolate one informational asym-
metry from the other. One can keep in mind a situation in which the valuable information
in performance appraisals is the verbal assessment and the information in written reports
is essentially meaningless.
While the model is straightforward to describe, writing down the equilibrium of the
full game is rather complicated since the contracts that rms oer the worker in period
0 depend on how his equilibrium eort choices in periods 1 and 2 depend on information
disclosure, which in turn depend on the equilibrium of the game played between the
employer and market rms after period 2. So, rather than describe the full equilibrium
here, the paper instead solves the game via backward induction and provides a denition
of equilibrium for each sub-game.
3 Rewards to Talent
The equilibrium of the labor market competition game played between periods 2 and 3 is
important to understand in its own right since it determines how the worker's performance
in periods 1 and 2 is rewarded. Let aW
1 : P ! R+ be the worker's strategy in period
1 and aW




1) be rms' beliefs about these strategies. Prior to making a wage oer wE
3 ,
the employer has private information on the worker's ability in the form of the signals
y1 a
1 and y2 a
2 on which it can condition its wage oers. Essentially, this environment
is a straightforward modication of that in Waldman (1984), in which an employer with
a perfect signal of worker ability chooses the worker's job assignment and wage before the
outside market makes a counter-oer. Although this paper is dierent enough to warrant
a separate equilibrium derivation,16 they are mainly technical; the economic reasoning
underlying the result below is nearly identical to Waldman (1984).
Denote the strategy of the employer as wE
3 : (y1;y2) ! W E
3 and the strategy of market
rm m as wm
3 : wE
3 ! W m
3 . Denote by b E
1 the employer's updated belief on the worker's
ability after observing y1, by b E
2 the employer's updated belief on the worker's ability after
observing (y1;y2), and by b M the market rms' updated belief on the worker's ability after
observing wE
3 . As this is a straightforward signalling game, the paper uses the Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium solution concept to solve it.
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Conditions (1) and (2) require market rms and the employer to best respond to each
other's strategies. Conditions (3) and (4) require the employer to update its beliefs using
Bayes' Rule. The result that this rule is linear in the prior and signal, along with the
result that the weights take the above form are standard (see DeGroot 1970). Condition
(5) requires market rms to both use Bayes' Rule to update their beliefs on worker talent
and to correctly infer the information conveyed about the employer's private information
from observing wE
3 . Notice that no restrictions are placed on b M following observations
of wE
3 not on the equilibrium path.17
16In particular, here the employer has imperfect private information on worker ability, ability is nor-
mally (as opposed to uniformly) distributed, the outside market is modeled as two separate rms (as
opposed to one entity), and rms can only choose wages (as opposed to wages and job assignments).
17Technically speaking, one could allow the two market rms to have dierent beliefs following o-
9In fact, there are a continuum of equilibria that satisfy Denition 1, but all share the
same essential properties.
Proposition 1 In every pure strategy equilibrium, the worker remains with the employer
if and only if b E
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The key feature of every equilibrium wage schedule is that they contain only two
wages: one paid to worker types whose expected ability crosses the threshold  and
who stay with the employer; and another paid to worker types whose expected ability
falls short of  and who separate from the employer. If the employer paid two dierent
retained types two dierent wages in equilibrium, and the outside market believed these
signals credibly communicated private information, the employer would have an immedi-
ate incentive to \lie" to the market and tell it the worker of higher talent was the one of
lower talent through oering it a lower wage. Thus, within the set of retained workers,
credible communication between the employer and the outside market is impossible. The
reason that only one wage is paid to released workers is because of costly bidding. With-
out costly bidding, the employer could still only retain workers above  at a constant
wage, but could credibly communicate private information to the market for worker types
below . Providing information for these worker types would be costless and would not
aect third period prots. However, as discussed previously, the purpose of the paper
is to isolate the eects of employer-worker communication from employer-market com-
munication. Assuming costly wage oers not only avoids the problem of solving for the
optimal disclosure from the employer to the market, but has a realistic interpretation.
In order to discuss the equilibrium in more detail, note that any worker type  for
whom (1) the employer earns zero prot while incurring total labor costs W    and (2)
the outside labor market cannot protably bid away at a total cost larger than W   
gives rise to an equilibrium. In other words any pair (W;) that satises the following
equilibrium observations of wE
3 , but this would not alter the results.
10two conditions constitutes an equilibrium:
 + 












  W     0 (7)
From these conditions one can observe that  > 0 is a necessary (and, as the proof of
Proposition 1 shows, sucient) condition for there to exist an equilibrium in which the
employer retains any worker types. If  = 0 and the employer valued all worker-types the
same as the market rms did, it could never make zero prot on a worker type  while
paying it a wage equal to the expected market output of all types above it.18 Also, one can
easily establish that the set of values of  that satises (6) and (7) is unbounded above.
However, the qualitative features of the optimal disclosure policy only depend on the
existence of career concerns, which in turn exist whenever there is a positive probability
of meeting the performance standard . So as long as  is nite, equilibrium multiplicity
is not problematic.
Another important point to note is that , W, and W are all independent of the
worker's rst and second period eort choices as well as rms' beliefs about these eort
choices. The expectations computed over b E
2 in this section are market rms' expectations
over the employer's posterior belief on the worker's expected ability. Because the employer
and market rms share the same beliefs on the worker's eort choices, these expectations
depend only on , 2
, and 2
", and so these primitives alone determine the equilibrium
values of , W, and W. Therefore, the rest of the paper takes as given constants the
employer's retention threshold  as well as the payo to retention W = W   W.
Eort incentives for the worker arise because increasing output in the rst and second
periods increases b E
2 , which in turn increases the probability of earning the reputational
reward W. The next section explores the relationship between these incentives and
information disclosure.
18 Note also that whenever  > 0, turnover is ineciently high. The ecient turnover rule would be
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the employer would make negative prot on retained worker types near   in an equilibrium with the
ecient turnover rule. An interesting extension of the current model would be to examine the optimal
retention threshold  that balanced the trade-o between incentive provision and worker turnover, but
this paper does not consider this.
114 Eects of Information Disclosure
Before discussing the relationship between rst and second period eort and information
disclosure, one rst must derive equilibrium eort levels as a function of a given disclosure
policy P. The following denition determines their solution.
Denition 2 Equilibrium eorts level a
1(P) and a
2(P(y1);a
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1 = 1(y1   a

1) + (1   1) (12)
b 

2  b 
E
2 = 2(y2   a

2) + (1   2)b 

1 (13)
Condition (8) requires the worker in the second period to maximize the expected proba-
bility of earning the reputational reward minus his cost of eort, given a1 and y1 2 P(y1).
Condition (9) requires him in the rst period to maximize the expected probability of
earning the reputational reward minus his expected second period eort costs minus his
rst period eort costs, given P and his second period strategy.19 Conditions (10) and
(11) require the worker's strategies to coincide with rms' conjectures, and the nal two
conditions require the employer to update its beliefs on worker ability using Bayes' Rule.
The paper denotes by b 
t the employer's equilibrium belief on the worker's expected ability
after observing his output realizations through period t. One does not need to introduce
an expression for how the worker's beliefs evolve because his expected payo in the third
period depends solely on his employer's beliefs about his ability.
Clearly the distribution of b E
2 is key for determining eort incentives since its realized
value determines w3. It is given by
Lemma 1 b E
2 j y1;a1;a2  N
 
1(y1   a1) + (1   1) + 2(a1   a





If the employer knew the true value of a1 he would estimate the worker's ability to be
1(y1  a1)+(1 1). The second term in the expression for the mean of b E
2 j y1;a1;a2
represents \fooling": the dierence between the eort levels expected by the employer
and the ones exerted by the worker.
19The expectations in these expressions are taken with respect to y1.
12A concern for equilibrium existence is the potential non-concavity of (8) and (9).
However, concavity obtains when the cost of eort function is suciently convex to oset
any non-concavities in the other terms, so equilibrium eorts are stated assuming that C
is large enough for this to be the case.20
Proposition 2 There exists a C such that, for all C  C, there exist unique and positive





































































A rst implication of Proposition 2 is that the channel through which information
disclosure matters for eort comes via the information the worker receives about the
employer's beliefs about his expected ability: a
1 and a
2 are only aected by the realization
of y1 through the realization of b 
1(y1). Accordingly, much of the subsequent analysis
discusses information disclosure in terms of b 
1 rather than in terms of output.
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and negative feedback is the set Y N
1 (P) = Y D
1 (P)nY P
1 (P). Positive (negative) feedback
consists of all output realizations that are disclosed to the worker and that inform him
that his expected ability is above (below) the retention threshold. This distinction is
important because each type of disclosure has quite distinct eects.
4.1 Second period eort: eort risk
Eort incentives arise in the second period because the mean of b E
2 j y1;a1;a2 is increasing
in the gap (a2   a
2). So, by exerting more eort, the worker increases the probability of
capturing the reputational reward in the third period. This is simply a particular version
20One might worry that the worker may supply no eort if C is suciently large. In fact, for C large,
the marginal cost of supplying zero eort is zero, while the marginal benet is positive. So, zero eort
provision can never be an equilibrium outcome for large values of C.
13of the signal jamming incentive that lies at the heart of eort provision in all career
concerns models.
Figure 2: Second Period Eort and Information Disclosure
To see how second period eort depends on information, consider Figure 2. The
top portion shows equilibrium eort under a disclosure policy in which the worker always
learns b 
1. In this situation, second period eort is highest when b 
1 =  and monotonically
decreasing as b 
1 moves away from .21 This is because when b 
1 =  there is still a large
amount of uncertainty about whether the worker will remain with the employer in period
3, so eort is important on the margin for determining future payos. In contrast, as
b 
1 moves into the upper tail of the distribution, it becomes increasingly certain that the
worker will remain with the employer, while as b 
1 moves into the lower tail, it becomes
increasingly certain that he will leave. In these regions, a change in eort changes the
probability of receiving W very little, so equilibrium eort falls correspondingly.
An interesting observation is that positive and negative feedback have symmetric
eects on second period eort. A worker who is told that b 
1 lies some distance x above
 exerts just as much eort as a worker who is told that b 
1 lies a distance x below .
This is in contrast to behavioral perspectives on feedback that emphasize the encouraging
eects of positive feedback and the discouraging eects of negative feedback (Meyer, Kay,
and French 1965).
The bottom portion of Figure 2 shows equilibrium second period eort under a dis-
closure policy that reveals the value of interim expected ability between two points  2b
and b, and otherwise reports whether it lies in ( 1; 2b) or in (b;1). Clearly eort
remains the same as under the full disclosure policy for interim ability realizations that
lie in ( 2b;b). However, eort changes in the tails, where the worker now exerts an eort
21This also shows that the employer has an incentive to renege on his commitment to a disclosure
policy and simply tell the worker that b 
1 = .
14level formed by taking the expectation over all expected ability levels contained in the
associated partition element. Consider the case in which the worker learns his expected
ability lies in ( 1; 2b). Workers for whom b 
1 lies close to  2b now exert less eort than
under full disclosure because they are pooled with types further away from the retention
threshold. On the other hand, workers for whom b 
1 is very low will now work harder than
under full disclosure since they expect their ability to be closer to  than is actually the
case.
In general, then, moving from one disclosure policy to another will cause some ability
types to exert more eort and others to exert less. The rst interesting property of a
disclosure policy is that in expectation these changes cancel out.
Corollary 1 E[a
2 ] is independent of the disclosure policy.
The fact that expected second period eort does not depend on the disclosure policy
means that rms do not have to take into account the incentive eects of the worker's
reaction to feedback. This result relies on the quadratic eort cost assumption, since
this gives linear marginal costs, allowing one to use the law of total probability to com-
pute expected second period eort. Any deviation from quadratic costs will mean that
expected second period eort does depend on the disclosure policy, but the paper main-
tains the quadratic assumption to isolate the trade-o between risk and coasting without
introducing a third eect as well.22
While a disclosure policy does not aect expected second period eort, it does aect
expected second period eort costs.






under P 0 than P.
Providing more information to the worker about his performance increases the variance of
his second period eort, which, because his preferences over eort are given by a convex
cost function, increases his disutility. In short, the worker prefers to exert a given eort
level with certainty than to do so in expectation. This is the rst substantive point about
feedback in organizations. It implies that if workers only exert eort for one period, the
surplus maximizing policy provides no information.




 > 1, the essential ndings of the paper are robust in the following sense. For any disclosure policy
that (1) reveals no information or (2) reveals an unbounded set of output realizations, there exists some
alternative disclosure policy that reveals a bounded set of output realizations and that yields higher
surplus.
154.2 First period eort: coasting incentive
While feedback has no second period incentive eects, it does have rst period incentive
eects. As given in Proposition 2, rst period equilibrium eort consists of two parts.
These derive from the two ways the worker has of fooling the employer in period 1. The
rst is to increase the gap a1   a
1 by increasing a1. This is again signal jamming, and is













which is independent of the disclosure policy. This is equal to second period eort under
the no disclosure policy P N: in both cases, the worker has no additional information
beyond the prior distribution on which to base his eort choice.
The second way in which the worker can fool the employer in the rst period is more
subtle and relates to the gap a2   a
2. Recall that a
2 is equal not only to the worker's
equilibrium second period eort level, but also his employer's belief about the amount of






































which is a constant independent of y1. Thus the worker can use rst period eort to
inuence the amount of eort that the employer expects him to exert in the second, but
only when the disclosure policy reveals y1 directly.
Now, the worker wants to reduce the amount of eort his employer expects of him so
that it attributes more of his second period output to his innate ability rather than to his
eort. In other words, he wants the employer to believe he is \coasting" in the second
period and not exerting high eort. Whenever the worker learns y1,
@b E
1 (y1)
@a1 > 0. However,
how this translates into a change in a
2 is asymmetric. When b E
1 (y1) < , increasing a1
increases a
2 by pushing b E
1 (y1) closer to , the point at which the employer expects
maximum eort. In this case, the worker wants to reduce his rst period eort. On the
other hand, when b E
1 (y1) > , increasing a1 decreases a
2 by pushing b E
1 (y1) further away
from . In this case, the worker wants to raise his rst period eort. Thus, the coasting
incentive can either work to increase rst period eort or lower it.
16Corollary 3 Suppose two disclosure policies P and P 0 are such that Y P
1 (P 0)  Y P
1 (P)
and Y N
1 (P)  Y N
1 (P 0). Then a
1 is higher under P than under P 0.
The eort maximizing disclosure policy P E thus maximizes the amount of positive
feedback and minimizes the amount of negative feedback. In a sense, the coasting in-
centive is related to the ratchet eect studied previously in the dynamic moral hazard
literature. In both cases, the agents's current eort aects the principal's expectations
about future performance. Here, though, coasting can work to both increase and decrease
rst period eort, whereas the ratchet eect is usually seen as discouraging eort. More-
over, the employer can endogenously choose the strength of the coasting incentive by
altering the amount of information the worker receives about his performance, whereas
feedback is not an instrument for inuencing the ratchet eect.
Now that the paper has identied the two channels through which information disclo-
sure operates, it can nally turn to answering its basic question: what disclosure policies
do rms oer the worker in period 0?
5 Equilibrium Disclosure Policy
The previous section solved for the equilibrium eort levels conditional on the worker
already having joined one of the rms under some xed disclosure policy. The analysis
now moves to the beginning of the game (period 0) in which the worker is not yet
matched with any rm and in which rms simultaneously oer contracts to the worker.














































That is, rms maximize the worker's utility subject to earning zero prot. Substituting
for wi
0 and using the fact that  and period 3 compensation are independent of P i, one
can conclude that each rm oers the worker the surplus maximizing disclosure policy

















Of course P S depends on the eort level with no information disclosure. Since the





< 1 so that rst period eort is less than rst best under no disclosure. In
17this case, P S must satisfy a risk-incentive trade-o, but one that is quite distinct from the
one familiar from the moral hazard literature (Holmstr om 1979). There, the instrument
for inducing eort is output pay and the associated risk is over wealth levels. Here, the
instrument for inducing (rst period) eort is positive feedback, and the associated risk







y1 if y1 2 [y;y]
( 1;y) [ (y;1) if y1 2 ( 1;y) [ (y;1)
where  < b 
1(y) < b 
1(y) < 1.
One can build up the intuition for the result step-by-step. As discussed in the previous
section, the coasting incentive only arises over the set of output realizations directly
revealed to the worker. Thus P S should only contain only one non-singleton element. If
a disclosure policy contained two non-singleton elements, one could combine them without
changing rst period eort. At the same time, one would decrease expected second period
eort costs (by Corollary 2) through reducing eort risk. So disclosure policies of the form
\reveal whether output is above or below 0" or \reveal whether output lies in ( 10;10)
or ( 1;10) [ (10;1)" can never maximize surplus.




< 1, negative feedback is doubly bad. First it further
reduces rst period eort from its already ineciently low level, and second it exposes the
worker to eort risk. Therefore P S provides no negative feedback. Combining this insight
with the one that P S can only contain one non-singleton element means that in the search
for P S one only needs to consider disclosure policies that can be fully described by the set
of (equilibrium) beliefs on expected ability that the employer reveals to the worker, which




1(y1) j y1 2 Y D
1 (P)
o
. Consider moving from
disclosure policy P to disclosure policy P 0 that satises d
1 (P 0) = d
1 (P)[[t;t + "] where
" is small and t 2 (;1). This raises rst period surplus on the margin by increasing
rst period eort and lowers second period surplus on the margin by increasing expected
eort costs. The following gure plots out the associated marginal benet and cost curves
for all t 2 (;1). It is important to keep in mind that this gure is drawn for any P that
has one non-singleton element, provides no negative feedback, and for which Ca
1(P) < 1,
not just P S.
One can show that the marginal cost of disclosing additional beliefs [t;t + "] is pro-
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Figure 3: Marginal Cost and Benet of Information Disclosure
In words, the additional risk to which the worker is exposed when one moves from a
disclosure policy that keeps [t;t + "] hidden and one that reveals [t;t + "] is proportional
to the squared dierence between the eort level that the worker exerts under the original
disclosure policy conditional on not learning his expected ability and the eort level the
worker exerts conditional on learning that b 
1 = t. This risk is highest when t is large and
when t is near . In the rst case the worker's eort conditional on learning t is much
lower than the eort level he would exert conditional on not learning his type, and in
the second case his eort conditional on learning t is much higher than he would exert
under ignorance of his type. On the other hand there exists some e t such that the worker's
eort conditional on learning b 
1 = e t is exactly equal to the eort level he exerts under
ignorance. Disclosing the additional beliefs

e t;e t + "

to the worker thus exposes him to
almost no additional risk.
On the other hand, the marginal benet of additional disclosure depends on the
strength of the coasting incentive, which itself is proportional to the sensitivity of the
employer's conjecture on the worker's second period eort to rst period eort. When
b 
1 is near , this conjecture is at since it is near is maximum value. When b 
1 is very
large, it is also at since it is near its minimum. The key point is that the additional
coasting incentives generated by disclosing [t;t + "] are small in exactly the cases in which
the additional risk is large and vice versa. Thus the surplus maximizing policy conceals
beliefs near  and large beliefs and reveals intermediate beliefs.23
Discussion. The rst, and perhaps most important, implication of Proposition 3 is
that the surplus maximizing disclosure policy features partial information disclosure.




> 1, PS reveals a bounded interval





= 1; that is, when signal jamming incentives alone give rise to rst-best rst period eort.
19The possibility of information disclosure from managers to workers raises social welfare,
and as long as implementing such systems is not too costly, it is ecient to invest in
them. However, in environments in which workers receive reputational rewards such as
professional service rms, the most ecient way to use feedback systems is not neces-
sarily to provide full information. Prima facie, one cannot conclude that it is inecient
for companies to set up performance appraisal systems and for managers to subsequently
use these systems to deliver limited feedback.
The model also shows that the ecient disclosure policy is characterized by a partic-
ular type of limited feedback. If the worker's rst period output lies between y and y,
he learns the precise value of his expected ability. If his rst period output lies outside of





 y1 2 Y1n[y;y]
i
. The
interesting point here is that the worker never learns that his expected ability lies in
the tails of the distribution, and that the rating distribution is concentrated. Broadly
speaking, this is consistent with stylized facts about real world rating distributions.24
The model also claries other, more subtle, potentially false intuitions about feedback
and motivation. Although positive feedback is a way of alleviating ineciently low eort
provision, it is never used to fully eliminate the ineciency. Suppose that the employer
is using a disclosure policy P at which Ca
1(P) = 1. Then, since eort is already at its
rst best level, removing a small interval of positive feedback reduces rst period surplus
very little compared to the reduction in risk.25 So, the trade-o between incentives and
risk is never resolved by fully eliminating the rst period ineciency.26
Recall from section 4.2 that the eort maximizing disclosure policy P E takes the
form d
1 (P E) = (;1); that is, it provides maximum positive feedback by revealing
all expected ability realizations above the retention standard. This section shows that
the output realizations disclosed under P S are a strict subset of the output realizations
disclosed under P E. Thus the worker receives more information about his performance
24Prendergast (1999) writes on page 30 of his oft-cited overview of incentives in organizations that
There is considerable evidence in the personnel literature that supervisors distort sub-
jective performance ratings by not suciently dierentiating good from bad performance
in their ratings...Two relevant forms of compression are noted in this literature: \centrality
bias" and \leniency bias." Centrality bias refers to a practice where supervisors oer all
workers ratings that dier little from a norm. Leniency bias implies that supervisors simply
overstate the performance of the poor performers. Such compression is well documented in
the personnel literature...
Note, however, that the model cannot speak to the phenomenon of grade ination in which supervisors
overstate performance. By assumption, disclosure policies can hide information from workers but cannot
deceive them.
25A more formal argument is given in the proof of Proposition 3
26This is similar in avor to the well-known result that in a moral hazard problem with a risk neutral
principal, an agent with CARA preferences, a production function with a normal error term, and linear
contracts, the optimal contract never implements rst best eort due to the agent's risk aversion.
20under the eort maximizing policy than is ecient. Suppose one compared two rms
with workers of similar talent, one of which used P E and one of which used P S. One
would observe that the former provided more information to workers and enjoyed higher
productivity levels. It would be tempting to conclude that it was also pursuing an un-
ambiguously superior policy disclosure policy, but this is false. The risk that workers in
the rm using P E face outweighs the associated gain in productivity.
Of course, this observation only matters if there are convincing reasons for why one
might observe P E in practice. In many occupations in which career concerns operate,
rms have bargaining power with respect to entry level workers while competition for
talented experienced workers is strong, with a correspondingly high wage dierential
between junior and senior members of a rm (Maister 1993). If entry level workers are
wealth constrained and future expected reputational rewards are high compared to initial
eort costs, rms can oer P E and still satisfy the worker's participation constraint. In
this case, rms would not internalize eort risk and would provide too much information.27
Also, if line managers are rewarded on the basis of their workers' productivity alone, they
would also not internalize the increased disutility of eort they impose on workers by using
P E. The main message here is that the possibility of too much information disclosure is
as legitimate a concern as too little information in the presence of career concerns.
6 Disclosure with Symmetric Information in the La-
bor Market
One of the most important assumptions in the model is that outside rms cannot observe
worker output. While eort risk and coasting are presumably general eects in career
concerns models with history dependent eort, their direction and magnitude are linked
to the payo to reputation, which in turn is determined by the amount of information
labor market participants have about worker performance. Ultimately, Proposition 3
relies on the reward schedule derived in Proposition 1. This section therefore explores the
robustness of Proposition 3 to an alternative assumption about market rms' information;
namely, that they perfectly observe y1 and y2.28 It continues to assume that the worker
remains with the employer for periods 1 and 2 and that the employer alone controls what
27In occupations characterized by high returns to promotion, previous research has found evidence of
over provision of eort (Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor 1996). These industries' feedback policies may
thus worsen an already existing \rat race" brought on large reputational rewards.
28One concern is that observability opens up the possibility of contracting on output. However, the
paper adopts the approach in Holmstr om (1999) and continues to assume that career concerns remain
the only source of eort incentive in spite of observability. Of course, nothing about observability implies
veriability.
21the worker observes about y1.
Under symmetric labor market information, solving for the rewards schedule is much
easier than before. While the bidding cost and human capital accumulation assumptions
from the baseline model are important for characterizing equilibria, here they are not, so
one can set  =  = 0 for simplicity. After they observe y1 and y2, market rms share the
same belief as the employer on worker ability, so that b M = b E
2 . Firms then engage in a
standard Bertrand bidding game in which the worker stays in the industry at a wage equal
to his expected output if his expected output is non-negative, and otherwise leaves the
industry and earns his outside option 0. The paper makes the additional assumption that
there is some xed reward component F of remaining in the industry. This could represent
many situations. For example, there could be some non-monetary compensation from
remaining with the employer like moving to a bigger oce or there could be psychological






F + b E
2 if b E
2  0
0 if b E
2 < 0:
(19)
The main dierence between this wage schedule and the one in the asymmetric informa-
tion case is that the worker earns a higher wage when his reputation increases, conditional
on remaining in the industry. Before, more talented workers did not earn higher wages
because market participants had no way of distinguishing talented workers from mediocre
ones. Now, since output information is available to outside rms, they are willing to pay
more to workers whose performance is better. The resulting equilibrium eort levels are
given by the following.
Proposition 4 There exists a C such that, for all C  C, there exist unique and positive












































































































Eort incentives now come from two sources. First, the worker wants to signal an
ability level above 0 to remain in the industry and earn the xed reward F. This source
22of eort incentives works just like the asymmetric information case: the rst term of (20)
is equal to the expression for a
2 in Proposition 2 taking  = 0 and W = F. Second, the
worker wants to signal a high ability in order to increase his third period wage conditional
on remaining in the industry. This is reected in the second term of (20), which is absent
from the expression for a
2 in Proposition 2. Figure 4 plots second period eort under full
disclosure.
0
Figure 4: Second Period Eort Under Full Disclosure
Even though the wage schedule is now increasing in expected ability above 0, the




F . The intuition is the same as before: for high and low levels of b 
1(y1), eort
at the margin matters very little for changing the probability of remaining in the industry.
However, there is an important dierence with the asymmetric information case. Rather
than dropping to 0 as b 
1(y1) becomes large, a
2 now limits to
2
C because increases in
b E
2 translate into higher wages even as earning F becomes a near certainty. The next
result shows the associated implications for the ecient disclosure policy, where d
1 (P)
is dened as in the previous section.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Ca
1(P N) < 1. For every P for which d







or ;, one can nd a P 0 for whcih d






and that yields a higher surplus than P.
Moreover, there exists a 
0
such that, for all  > 
0
, for every P for which d
1 (P) = ;
or for which d
1 (P) is unbounded above, one can nd a P 00 for which d







and that yields a higher surplus than P.
One can think about feedback here the same way as before. First, coasting incentives









F . Second, all feedback will increase
23eort risk. So the ecient policy has only one non-singleton element that contains all




F and must resolve a risk-incentive trade-o for





The fact that reputational incentives do not decline to 0 for high realizations of ex-
pected ability presents two complications for characterizing the ecient policy. To see
them, note that the marginal cost of replacing disclosure policy P with a disclosure policy
P 0 for which d
1 (P 0) = d
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The rst complication is that one cannot always nd a measure of \riskless" beliefs to
disclose to the worker. While the MC curve plotted in Figure 3 always had a mini-
mum point of 0, here this is not the case. In particular, under the no disclosure policy





. Since A(t) 
2














C . Thus, depending on the strength of the
coasting incentive, P N might actually maximize surplus. The second complication is
that one cannot necessarily rule out the possibility that the ecient policy reveals a












C . The risk to which workers are exposed
from adding beliefs [t;t + "] tends to zero as t ! 1; moreover, one can show that the
marginal benet of adding beliefs [t;t + "] to d
1 (P) exceeds the marginal cost as t ! 1.







1(y1) = 2 d
1 (P)
i
is bound away from
2
C for the relevant set of disclosure
policies. Thus a crucial property of the rewards schedule in the baseline case is that
reputational incentives disappear for high output realizations.
While all of the qualitative features of the ecient policy are only carried through
to the symmetric information case if  is large, important messages emphasized in the
previous section are preserved regardless of the value of . First, the ecient amount
of information for the worker to receive is a coarsening of the underlying performance
distribution. Second, when the ecient disclosure policy reveals some information, it will
never fully eliminate the ineciency in rst period eort. Finally, the eort maximizing
disclosure policy provides strictly more information than the surplus maximizing policy
for all parameter values.
247 Conclusion
This paper has argued that limited feedback in organizations is compatible with eciency
in the presence of career concerns. Thus, one must take great care in drawing any welfare
conclusions from empirical evidence on limited feedback. Without going deeper into the
reasons for why an organization provides limited feedback, one cannot determine whether
more feedback would increase surplus. Indeed, if rms do not internalize workers' eort
risk, they may even provide too much feedback.
Of course feedback in the real world operates through many channels that are not
present in this model. For example, the ratings a manager gives a worker often serve as
an input into bonus and promotion decisions. Also, performance appraisals often serve
a training purpose by informing workers about how to do their jobs better. A more
complete model that incorporated these other eects may well favor more information
disclosure.
Still, given the absence of a well-developed economic literature on feedback in organi-
zations, the model provides a starting point for thinking about feedback in environments
where reputation matters for promotion. At the very least it provides answers to the
questions of whether performance appraisals can increase rm value and whether more
feedback is always better. The answer to the rst is yes and to the second is no. Answers
to more detailed questions with more empirical content await future research.
25A Proofs
A.1 Section 3
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let WE
3 be the set of equilibrium actions dened by wE
3 . For all wE
3 2 WE
3 , M1 and
M2 engage in a Bertrand bidding game whose solution is standard. Each rm oers the worker







3 )    if b M(wE
3 )   wE
3    > 0
b M(wE
3 )    or 0 if b M(wE
3 )   wE
3    = 0
0 if b M(wE
3 )   wE
3    < 0:
(24)
Let Y 0 =

(y1;y2) j wE
3 (y1;y2) > 0
	
be the set of output pairs after which the employer
makes a positive wage oer to the worker. In equilibrium it must be the case that
b M(wE
3 (y1;y2))   wE
3 (y1;y2)     0 8(y1;y2) 2 Y 0: (25)
That is, the employer cannot make a positive wage oer that it knows the market will better,
since otherwise the employer would be better o oering wE
3 = 0 and saving the bidding cost
. Also it must be that
 + b E
2 (y1;y2)   wE
3 (y1;y2)     0 8(y1;y2) 2 Y 0: (26)
That is, the employer must make non-negative prot to all workers to whom it makes a positive
wage oer. Otherwise, it would again improve prot by oering wE
3 = 0.
Now suppose there exists some pair of outputs (y1
1;y1
2)  Y 0 and (y2
1;y2










Then, from the arguments above, it must be the case that
b M(wEi
3 )   wEi
3     0 for i = 1;2
as well as




3     0 for i = 1;2
But then the employer strictly improves prot by oering the wage wE2




3 : it continues to retain the worker while paying strictly lower wage costs. So the
employer can only make one positive wage oer W in equilibrium.
Because the wage oered to workers retained in equilibrium cannot vary with b E
2 , it must
be the case that the employer retains all workers for whom b E
2   where  satises
 +    W    = 0:
That is, the employer retains all workers on whom it makes non-negative prot. In equilibrium
the market rms must correctly infer this rule, so that their estimate on worker talent after
observing W is
b M





  b E
2  
i
26Thus, for an equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that the pair (W;) satises the following
two conditions:









    W; (28)
which in turn imply that  must satisfy









One now needs to establish the existence of a  that satises (29). First note that because
b E











































and variance that one can denote by 2. Now consider the function









Two helpful results from distribution theory (Greene 2003, p.759) are the following, where  is















0 (a) =  (a)( (a)   a) 2 (0;1) 8a 2 R (32)





































































implying that limx!1 f(x) = 0.
The above arguments show that (29) is satised for any   x, where x uniquely satises
27f(x) =  . Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, the employer retains all workers for whom
b E
2    x at a wage W that satises (27). If b E
2 <  the employer sets wE
3 = 0 and the
worker's wage is implied by (24).
Finally, the proposed equilibrium exists as long as the employer can make no protable
deviation to some wE
3 other than 0 or W. In order to rule out this possibility, one can set
b M(wE
3 )  b M(W) 8wE
3 6= f0;Wg
so that market rms infer the worker to have a higher ability after observing an out-of-
equilibrium wage oer that after observing W.
A.2 Section 4
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. b E




















1(y1   a1) + (1   1) + (a2   a
2)

+ (1   2)
 
1(y1   a1) + (1   1) + 1 (a1   a
1)

=1(y1   a1) + (1   1) + 2(a1   b a1 + a2   b a2)
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2






   b 1(y1)   2(a1   a






















   b 1(y1)   2(a1   a









As a2 ! 0, (34) > 0, while as a2 ! 1, (34) < 0. So an interior solution to the optimization










   b 1(y1)   2(a1   a









which limits to  1 as C ! 1. So there exists a C1 such that, for all C > C1, (33) is globally
concave and the rst order condition gives as a global maximum
aW








































Suppose there are n 2 N non-singleton elements of the disclosure policy P and that non-
singleton element Y i
1 for i 2 f1; ;ng is made up of mi 2 N intervals. Denote by y
ij and
yij the left and right endpoints of the jth such interval. Also, suppose that Y D
1 is made up of
md 2 N intervals and denote by y






P(yB + ") 6= P(yB   ")
o
:
be the set of boundary points between the elements of P. Each nite interval endpoint described
above is a member of Y B.









































































Here fz is the pdf of z  N(;2
+2






constants independent of z. The indicator functions in the limits of integration takes account
of the fact that one need not transform the two innite interval endpoints by subtracting a1.









































































































































fz(yB   a1)   Ca1: (39)





























































For the sake of space the paper does not compute the second derivative. One can show that
it tends to  1 as C ! 1 so that there exists a C2 such that (39) is globally concave for all
C > C2. In this case the rst order condition is sucient for a maximum.
It remains to be shown that the rst order condition has an interior solution.29 The rst
step is to derive conditions under which the rst three terms of (39) are positive as a1 ! 0.
As one can see from (40) the second term is always positive. From (36) and (37) one obtains
limC!1 aW
2 = 0, limC!1 a
2 = 0, and limC!1
@a
2
@a1 = 0. So the third term of (39) limits to 0 as





















So there exists a C3 such that the rst and third terms of (39) are positive at a1 = 0 for all
C  C3. By observation (39) tends to  1 as a1 ! 1. So for all C  C3, the rst order
condition has a unique interior solution given by aW
1 . Thus whenever C > maxfC1;C2;C3g
the worker's rst and second period optimization problems have unique interior solutions. One
then obtains expressions for equilibrium eort by imposing the condition a
1 = aW
1 and noting





It remains to be shown that a












































1 ! 0, h(a
1) ! h > 0 and as a
1 ! 1, h(a
1) ! 1. So as long as h is strictly increasing














































Clearly there exists a C4 such that (42) is positive for all C  C4. The proposition is established
by setting C = maxfC1;C2;C3;C4g.
29The rst order condition for a1 is obtained by setting (39) equal to zero.
30A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 1











































which is independent of P.
A.2.4 Proof of Corollary 2




i=1 [ Y D
1 and the elements of P0 are Y 11


























































































































which is satised by the discrete version of Jensen's inequality.





i=1 [ Y D





i=2 [ Y D0
1 where Y 10
1  Y 1
1 and Y D
























































































































by the probability version of Jensen's inequality. Moreover, by the arguments above, the last














To complete the proof, note that every renement of P can be generated by a step-wise repe-
tition of the above two simple renements. Thus, by applying the above arguments sequentially,
31one arrives at the conclusion.
A.3 Section 5
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let d
1 (P) be as dened in the text. The proof proceeds in two stages. First it
establishes the form that d
1 (PS) takes. It then shows that there exists a PS that induces
d
1 (PS).
Let P and P0 be disclosure policies that satisfy d
1 (P0) = d
1 (P)[(t;t + "). By Corollary
2 moving from P to P0 increases expected second period eort costs, and the following gives
the amount by which it does so when " is small. In the proof f denotes the probability density


























































































1 = 2 d













1 = 2 d
1 (P) [ (t;t + ")
#2




































































































The derivative of the term in brackets with respect to " is
2

   t   "
2














1 = 2 d





1 = 2 d













1 = 2 d











f (t + ")Pr
h
b 
1 = 2 d













1 = 2 d





1 = 2 d
1 (P) [ (t;t + ")
i








1 = 2 d





   t   "
2














1 = 2 d
1 (P) [ (t;t + ")
#!2
f (t + ")
  















1 = 2 d
1 (P) [ (t;t + ")
#
f (t + "):
Taking the limit as " ! 0 gives the result.
Now a
















































































So the change in rst period welfare from adding beliefs (t;t + ") to d



























where A = 21



































































 1 since otherwise one could improve social welfare by









would yield a higher surplus than PS. This implies that PS contains no negative feedback since

















. Since P2 implements the same rst period eort while reducing risk, it
provides higher surplus than P1.
Fix a disclosure policy P0 for which d























is strictly decreasing on t 2 (;1) from (0) to 0, there exists a unique
point e t such that

 
























= 1. Then L(t;PS) = 0 for all
t 2 d
1 (PS) while there exists some t0 for which R(t0;PS) > 0. Thus replacing PS with a









n[t0;t0 + "] improves social welfare for small




< 1. So further assume that the P0
considered above satises Ca
1 (P0) < 1.









, there exists a unique point
tL(P0) < e t at which L(tL(P0);P0) = R(tL(P0);P0). Clearly L(t;P0) < R(t;P0) 8t 2 (;tL(P0))















































































































































while L is linear on the same domain. Moreover, limt!1
@R
@t = 1 while limt!1
@L
@t =
A < 1. So there exists a unique point tH(P0) > tL(P0) at which L(tH(P0);P0) = R(tH(P0);P0)
















and L(t;P0) < R(t;P0) 8t 2 (tH(P0);1). These
arguments establish that L(t;P0) > R(t;P0) 8t 2 (tL(P0);tH(P0)) and L(t;P0) < R(t;P0) 8t 2
(;tL(P0)) [ (tH(P0);1).












































Now A is bounded above by 21
C2 and as argued above d has some lower bound d. By the
















has two solutions t and t where  < t < t < 1. Finally, by (52) and (53) tH is never greater
than t.
Consider social surplus as a function of disclosure policies of the form d
1 = (L;H) where
  L  H  t. The rst section of the proof established the continuity of surplus in L
and H, so since   L  H  t is a compact set, one can use the Weierstrass Maximum
Theorem to establish the existence of a surplus maximizing disclosure policy PS for which
d
1 (PS) = (0
L;0
H) and  < 0
L < 0
H  t.
Thus if one can nd a disclosure policy P for which Y D
1 (P) = (y;y) and where y and































L   (1   1)
1
: (55)
Now when y =
0
L (1 1)
1 the LHS of (55) is smaller than the RHS since a





2 ] the LHS is bigger than the RHS since a
1 (y) < 2E[a
2 ]. Since the











which (55) holds and an optimal disclosure policy with the stated form exists.
30Here the paper makes an abuse of notation by making the dependence of a
1 on y rather than the
disclosure policy P.
35A.4 Section 6
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof.
E[w3 j y1;a1;a2 ]
= E
h
F + b E
2






















 b 1(y1)   2(a1   a















Where fb  represents the probability density function for b E
2 j y1;a1;a2 derived in Lemma 1.








2v + b 1(y1) + 2(a1   a




So, by Leibnitz's Rule,







b 1(y1) + 2(a1   a

















b 1(y1) + 2(a1   a






b 1(y1) + 2(a1   a











































From here one can proceed using equivalent arguments from Proposition 2.
A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. From arguments identical to those in Lemma 2, the change in second period surplus
from adding disclosed beliefs (t;t + ") to D





















































































By the same reasoning as on page 34, one can restrict attention to a disclosure policy
36P for which Ca



























= 0, establishing the rst
part of the claim.
Before continuing, the following lemma is helpful.

























































So A0(t) ? 0 for t 7
2
2
F . Moreover limt! 1 A(t) = 0 and limt!1 A(t) = 2
C . This implies that
there exists some t0 for which A(t) ? 2







  b 















































































































































































and both strictly greater
than 2






























































































So there exists a 
0







  b 





Now suppose that  > 
0





lies strictly between the maximum






for which MC(e t;PN) = 0 and
MB(e t;PN) > 0. So a disclosure policy P0 for which d
1 (P0) =
 
e t;e t + "

yields higher surplus
than PN for small enough epsilon.




































f(t) = 0. So there exists a nite point tH(P) for which
MC(tH(P);P) > MB(tH(P);P) 8t > tH(P):
One can show that tH is bounded above. First note that because there exists a e t at which




@tH by continuity. Let B =
1   Ca







  b 
1 = 2 d
1 (P)
i
































Note that B has an upper bound of 1 and D has a lower bound of 2
C +  for some  > 0. By
























for all t > t. By (62) and (63) tH  t.
To complete the proof note that replacing P with a disclosure policy P0 that satises
d
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